The USS Gerald Ford cost over $13 billion to build and was supposed to leapfrog every carrier that came before it. So why is the US Navy now publicly questioning whether to keep building more of them? The USS Gerald Ford problems that have accumulated since the ship's commissioning in 2017 tell a complicated story, one about ambitious technology, defense industry pressure, and what happens when a warship becomes too complex to actually use reliably.
What the Ford Class Was Supposed to Be
The Ford-class carriers were designed as a generational leap. More aircraft sorties per day. A smaller crew. Electromagnetic launch systems replacing aging steam catapults. Advanced radar. Reduced long-term operating costs. On paper, the case was compelling.
The problem is that "on paper" did a lot of heavy lifting. The Navy packed an enormous number of unproven technologies into a single hull at the same time, which is about as risky an engineering decision as you can make. When multiple new systems all need to work together before any of them have been individually proven, the margin for error shrinks fast.
In my reading of how major defense programs go wrong, this pattern shows up repeatedly: ambitious requirements, contractor enthusiasm, congressional pressure to keep costs "manageable" in the short term, and a delivery date that doesn't slip even when the hardware isn't ready. The Ford is a textbook case.
The EMALS Problem: When the Catapult Doesn't Work, Nothing Flies
The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, known as EMALS, replaced the steam catapults that had worked reliably on Nimitz-class carriers for decades. The theory was sound: electromagnetic systems offer more precise control over launch energy, produce less stress on airframes, and require fewer personnel to operate. In practice, EMALS became one of the most criticized systems in recent US military procurement history.
Early operational testing found that EMALS was failing far more often than the Navy's reliability requirements allowed. A 2017 report from the Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation flagged serious concerns. The system's complexity made troubleshooting difficult at sea, where you don't have the luxury of a factory floor and specialized engineers standing by. President Trump publicly complained about EMALS multiple times, at one point suggesting the Navy should go back to steam.
When the catapult fails at sea, it's not an inconvenience. It means aircraft can't launch, and the entire purpose of the carrier disappears.
The Navy says EMALS reliability has improved since initial delivery, and that's probably true. But "improved from unacceptably bad" is a different standard than "ready to anchor a $13 billion warship in a contested environment."
Weapons Elevators: A Problem That Took Years to Fix
The Ford carries 11 Advanced Weapons Elevators, designed to move ammunition from the magazines below decks to the flight deck quickly and efficiently. At commissioning, exactly zero of them were fully operational. That's not a typo. The ship was delivered with its ammunition supply chain broken.
By 2022, all 11 were finally certified as operational, nearly five years after the ship entered service. The manufacturer, General Atomics, and the Navy spent years trading blame over who was responsible for the delays. For a ship designed around high sortie rates, having non-functional weapons elevators was a fundamental contradiction.
What Combat Exposure Actually Revealed
The Ford deployed to the Mediterranean in 2023 following the Hamas attack on Israel, giving the Navy its first real-world operational data on the ship in a genuine crisis environment. The carrier performed its presence mission, but reports emerging afterward painted a more complicated picture of the ship's resilience under stress.
Iranian-linked drone and missile attacks in the region put US assets under pressure, and the Ford reportedly sustained some level of impact from strikes, though the Navy was not forthcoming with details. What followed was an extended repair period that one analysis suggested ran close to 12 months, which is a significant stretch of time for a ship that's supposed to be the backbone of American naval deterrence.
A common mistake I notice in coverage of naval incidents is treating any acknowledgment of damage as catastrophic. That's probably unfair. What matters is how long a ship is out of action and whether the damage revealed structural vulnerabilities. A year-long repair for a ship of the Ford's complexity is worth scrutinizing, even if it wasn't a catastrophic hit.
The Nimitz Comparison Driving the Entire Review
Here's the question the Navy is now officially asking: does the Ford class actually outperform the Nimitz class enough to justify the cost difference? It sounds like it should have been asked before building the things, but better late than never.
The comparison being run looks at sortie rates, aircraft wear, catapult efficiency (including cost per launch), and infrastructure expenses. If the Ford only modestly outperforms a Nimitz in day-to-day operations, and costs significantly more to build and maintain, the math starts to look awkward.
| Category | Ford Class | Nimitz Class |
|---|---|---|
| Unit cost (approx.) | $13+ billion | $6-8 billion |
| Launch system | EMALS (electromagnetic) | Steam catapults |
| Crew size | ~2,600 | ~3,200 |
| Weapons elevators | 11 advanced (delayed delivery) | Conventional (proven) |
| Status | 1 active, 1 on trials, 2 under construction | 10 active |
| Reliability record | Troubled early period | Decades of proven operation |
One analysis that has circulated in defense circles makes an uncomfortable point: the cost of two Ford-class carriers is roughly equivalent to three Nimitz-class hulls. Three carriers can cover more ocean, carry more aircraft, and provide more operational flexibility than two. If the Ford's performance advantages don't close that gap, the program's rationale weakens considerably.
CVN-82 and CVN-83: The Decisions That Haven't Been Made Yet
The Navy currently has CVN-78 (Ford) in active service, CVN-79 (Kennedy) finishing sea trials, and CVN-80 (Enterprise) and CVN-81 (Doris Miller) under construction. The question now is whether CVN-82 and CVN-83 get built as Fords, built as something else, or get cancelled.
Navy Secretary John Felan said at the Sea Air Space 2026 exhibition that the review of the program should wrap up within a month. He was careful not to rule anything out. His framing was practical: what can be simplified, what can be cut, what has to stay? That's not the language of someone about to cancel a program outright, but it's also not the language of someone fully committed to the existing design.
The question isn't whether the US will have carriers. It's whether those carriers will still be called Fords.
One possibility getting attention is a hybrid design that keeps the Ford's hull and some of its upgrades while reverting to proven systems like steam catapults for reliability and cost reasons. Another is a modernized Nimitz variant. Defense industry insiders have also noted that pressure from the proposed Trump-class battleship program is competing for the same shipbuilding budget, which adds a political dimension to what should be a purely technical question.
What This Means for US Naval Power
The US Navy operates 11 carriers, far more than any other country. China's most advanced carrier, the Fujian, uses EMALS technology and is widely seen as a direct response to American carrier doctrine. The irony is that China built its own electromagnetic launch carrier while the US was struggling to make its work reliably.
The Ford program's troubles don't mean American carriers are suddenly vulnerable or obsolete. What they do mean is that the procurement model that produced the Ford, in which dozens of unproven technologies are bundled into a single massive program, has real limits. If the Navy comes out of this review with a clearer, more reliable design for the next generation, the pain of the Ford's troubled development will have been worth something.
If you want to follow this story as it develops, the Sea Air Space conference announcements and the annual Pentagon operational testing reports are the two best primary sources. The DOT&E report, published each year, is remarkably candid about what's working and what isn't. Bookmark it and check when the next one drops. You'll get a clearer picture of where CVN-82 is headed than from almost any news source.
The Bottom Line on USS Gerald Ford Problems
The USS Gerald Ford problems aren't a secret, and they aren't a partisan talking point. They're a documented engineering and procurement challenge that the Navy has been working through for nearly a decade. The real question was always whether the technology would mature fast enough to justify the cost, and the honest answer, so far, is "not convincingly."
The review underway in 2026 is significant because it's the first time the program's future has been formally put on the table. Whether that leads to a redesign, a hybrid approach, or something else entirely, the outcome will shape American naval power for the next 50 years. That's worth paying attention to.
If you found this useful, the next logical read is a breakdown of what a modernized Nimitz or hybrid Ford might actually look like, and what China's Fujian tells us about where carrier technology is heading. Those are the two threads that will define how this story ends.
